AMC1 to Article 11 Conducting a UK Specific Operation Risk Assessment (UK SORA)

CAA ORS9 Decision No. 46

UK UAS regulatory requirements

1.

Introduction

1.1

The UK SORA methodology has been adapted from the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) SORA version 2.5 to enable UAS operators to comply with the requirements for conducting an operational risk assessment, as set out in Article 11 of Assimilated UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947. A full list of JARUS publications can be found here.

The UK SORA methodology is one acceptable means of compliance with Article 11 of UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947. This may include describing the technical features of the UAS by relying on a UAS configuration that has been granted a SAIL Mark certificate by the CAA, or by reference to the UK SORA requirements in so far as they apply to a specific UAS.

An Operational Authorisation is granted by the CAA on the basis of its evaluation of the OA Applicant’s risk assessment.

Operations out of scope for UK SORA

1.2

UK SORA may not be used for the following types of operation:

1. Operations outside the regulatory limitations of the Specific Category, such as;

   1. conducted over assemblies of people with a UA that has a characteristic dimension of 3m or more;

   2. carrying people;

   3. carrying dangerous goods that may result in high risk for third parties in the event of an accident

2. Operations outside the policy limits of the UK SORA, such as;

   1. operating unmanned aircraft with a dimension larger than 40 meters

   2. operating unmanned aircraft with a maximum cruise speed above 200 meters per second

   3. operations above Flight Level 660.

   4. using unmanned aircraft with a maximum dimension of more than 3 metres or maximum speed over 35 metres per second, where the population density is greater than 50,000 people per km2

3. Some operations require additional applications, outside the SORA, or may require the use of policy that has not yet been released. Please contact the CAA via uksora@caa.co.uk before starting an application, if this applies to your operation. This includes;

   1. Multiple Simultaneous Operations

   2. Operations that require an airspace change

   3. Operations involving the carriage of Dangerous Goods (where this can be achieved in the Specific Category)

1.3

Before starting the UK SORA process the applicant should consider if any of the above criteria apply to the proposed operation. If the answer is yes, then the UK SORA process may not be used for the application.

1.4

If UK SORA may not be used, the applicant should contact the CAA regarding alternative options via uksora@caa.co.uk.

Multiple location applications

1.5

For operations conducted under Visual Line of Sight (VLOS), UK SORA may be used to conduct a risk assessment for operations conducted at multiple locations. The applicant must demonstrate that the UK SORA requirements will be met for all flights performed under the operational authorisation. If an applicant can demonstrate they have sufficient procedures in place to correctly identify operational volumes, buffers, adjacent areas, and characterise airspace, a generic location authorisation may be issued by the CAA.

1.6

For operations conducted under Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS), UK SORA may be used to conduct a risk assessment for operations conducted at multiple locations. The applicant must demonstrate that the UK SORA requirements will be met for all flights performed under the operational authorisation. The operational authorisation will detail the specific operational volumes and buffers authorised, which must be included in the operation details during the application. The operator must not define their own operational volumes, buffers, adjacent areas, or characterise airspace without approval from the CAA.

1.7

The CAA may limit the number of locations or specific locations when assessing an application for the purpose of effective safety management, impact on air traffic, or excessive application time or cost.

The UK SORA process

Managing risk using SORA

1.8

The categories of harm considered in UK SORA are the potential for:

(i) fatal injuries to third parties on the ground;

(ii) fatal injuries to first parties in the air.

1.9

As the UK SORA only addresses safety risk, it is acknowledged that the CAA, when appropriate, may also consider additional categories of harm (e.g. privacy, disruption of a community, environmental damage, financial loss, etc.). Other regulations account for the additional categories.

Target level of safety (TLOS)

1.10

The UK SORA uses a holistic safety risk management process to evaluate the risks related to a given operation and then provide proportionate requirements that an operation should meet to ensure a Target Level of Safety (TLOS) is met.

1.11

This TLOS is defined for people and aircraft uninvolved in the operation and is commensurate with existing manned aviation levels of safety to these same stakeholders. These values were chosen by JARUS to ensure that UAS operations would not pose more risk to third parties than manned aviation which are seen as socially acceptable rates (see Section 5(f) in the Scoping Paper to AMC RPAS 1309 Issue 2 and Section 1.2.1 in JARUS SORA Annex F version 2.5). The specific TLOS figures are also summarised in the JARUS SORA Main Body 2.5.

1.12

The UK CAA is working with JARUS to provide updated accident data and to validate the underlying assumptions contained within Scoping Paper to AMC RPAS 1309 Issue 2. In addition, the CAA is conducting a broader analysis of quantitative methods for risk assessments including the future publication of TLOS figures for UAS operations.

1.13

At the time of publication, an application using the UK SORA methodology shall be assumed to meet the JARUS SORA 2.5 TLOS and therefore compliant with UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947 on rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment (3). The assessment shall propose a target level of safety, which shall be equivalent to the safety level in manned aviation, in view of the specific characteristics of UAS operation.

Semantic model in the context of UK SORA

1.14

UK SORA uses a semantic model with standardised terminology for phases of operation, procedures, and operational volumes.

Figure 1 – UK SORA Semantic Model

Figure 2 - The Operational Volume

Operation Control States

1.15

The UK SORA considers an operation to be in either a state of control, or a state of loss of control.

The operational volume

1.16

The operational volume is made up of the flight volume and the contingency volume and should be provided in latitude and longitude as either a centre point with radius, or multi point polygon. Vertical extent should be given in height above ground or altitude above sea level.

The flight volume

1.17

For normal operations, the UA must only operate inside the flight volume using standard operating procedures.

1.18

Depending on the type of operation, the flight volume may be defined as a flight corridor for each planned trajectory, a larger volume to allow for a multitude of similar flights with changing flight paths, or a set of different flight volumes fulfilling specific conditions.

1.19

The flight volume should be sufficiently large for the planned operation. Whenever a particular flight requires the UA to traverse or loiter/hold at a specific point of interest, this point must be included inside the flight volume.

The contingency volume

1.20

The contingency volume surrounds the flight volume. The outer limit of the contingency volume is equivalent to the outer limit of the operational volume.

1.21

Entry into the contingency volume is always considered an abnormal situation and requires the execution of appropriate contingency procedures to return the UA to the flight volume.

1.22

An abnormal situation may also occur inside the flight volume.

The ground risk buffer

1.23

The ground risk buffer is an area on the ground that surrounds the footprint of the contingency volume.

1.24

If the UA exits the contingency volume during a loss of control of the operation, it should end its flight within the ground risk buffer.

1.25

The size of the ground risk buffer is based on the individual risk of an operation and is driven by the flight characteristics of the UA and the containment requirements. Refer to JARUS SORA 2.5 Annex A for further guidance.

The adjacent area

1.26

The adjacent area represents the ground area where it is reasonably expected a UA may crash after a loss of control situation.

1.27

The adjacent area is calculated starting from the outer limit of the operational volume.

1.28

The size of the adjacent area depends on the UA performance.

The adjacent airspace

1.29

The adjacent airspace is the airspace where it is reasonably expected that an unmanned aircraft may fly after a loss of control.

States of operation

Operation in control

1.30

An operation is considered in control when the remote crew can continue the management of the current flight situation, such that no persons on the ground or in the air are endangered. This remains true for both normal and abnormal situations. However, the safety margins in the abnormal situation are reduced.

1.31

There are two states of operation in control:

(i) Normal operation utilise standard operating procedures (SOP), which are a set of operating instructions covering policies, procedures, and responsibilities set out by the applicant.

(ii) Abnormal situation is an undesired state where it is no longer possible to continue the flight using SOPs. However, third parties on the ground or in the air are not in immediate danger. In this case contingency procedures must be applied to prevent a loss of control or excursion from the operational volume.

1.32

In an abnormal situation, the remote crew must attempt to return the operation back into the controlled state by executing contingency procedures as soon as practicable.

Figure 3 - States of operation

Abnormal Situation

Contingency procedures

1.33

Contingency procedures are designed to prevent a loss of control that has an increased likelihood of occurring due to the current abnormal situation. These procedures should return the operation to a controlled state and the use of SOP’s or allow the safe termination of the flight.

1.34

Contingency procedures must be activated as soon as the UA deviates from its intended flight path, or behaves abnormally, to prevent it leaving the operational volume.

1.35

If contingency procedures cannot rectify the abnormal situation, or the UA approaches the outer edge of the contingency volume, emergency procedures must be applied to safely terminate the flight.

Loss of control (LOC) of the operation

1.36

A Loss of Control (LOC) typically has the following characteristics:

(i) It could not be handled by a contingency procedure; or

(ii) Any occurrence where the safety of the aircraft, operator, other airspace users or members of the public is compromised or reduced to a level whereby potential for harm or damage is likely to occur (or only prevented through luck).

1.37

This includes situations where a UA has exited the operational volume and is potentially operating over or in an area of ground or air risk for which the UAS operator is not authorised.

1.38

The LOC state is also entered if a UA does not follow the authorised route and the remote pilot is unable to control it, an automatic failsafe is initiated, or the Flight Termination System (FTS) is activated, even if this happens inside the operational volume.

Emergency procedures

1.39

Emergency procedures must be executed whenever a LOC state is entered, even if it is within the operating volume. They must be executed by the remote crew and may be supported by automated features of the UAS (or vice versa) and are intended to mitigate the effect of failures that cause or could lead to an unsafe outcome.

1.40

Regardless of other actions and responses by the flight crew, the emergency procedures must always be executed before crossing the outer edge of the contingency volume, which would otherwise result in an operational volume excursion.

Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

1.41

The ERP is used for coordinating all activities needed to respond to incidents and accidents. It is different from emergency procedures, as it does not deal with LOC but actions to be taken afterwards.

Containment

1.42

Containment consists of technical and operational mitigations that are intended to contain the flight of the UA within the defined operational volume and ground risk buffer to reduce the likelihood of a LOC resulting in an operational volume excursion.

Robustness

1.43

Robustness is the term used to describe the combination of two key characteristics of a risk mitigation or operational safety objective:

(i) the level of integrity (LOI) i.e., how good the mitigation/objective is at reducing risk.

(ii) the level of assurance (LOA) i.e., the degree of certainty with which the level of integrity is ensured.

1.44

The compliance evidence used to substantiate the level of integrity and assurance of an application are detailed in the Annexes B, C, D, and E. These annexes contain AMC, GM, or reference to industry standards and practices, where accepted by the CAA.

1.45

Table 1 provides guidance to determine the level of robustness based on the level of integrity and the level of assurance.

Table 1 - Robustness Levels

Integrity	Low Assurance	Medium Assurance	High Assurance
Low integrity	Low robustness	Low robustness	Low robustness
Medium integrity	Low robustness	Medium robustness	Medium robustness
High integrity	Low robustness	Medium robustness	High robustness

 

1.46

The applicant must provide a compliance approach and compliance evidence for mitigations and OSOs based on the SAIL level.

1.47

The CAA will assess the approach and evidence. For some requirements, the CAA may decide that a declaration of compliance is acceptable.

1.48

Applicants should refer to Annex A for a description of the difference between compliance approach and compliance evidence.

Roles, responsibilities, and definitions

General definitions relating to the UK SORA can be found in CAP 722D. Some specific definitions are included below.

The use of the word ‘must’ in the context of AMC/GM to Article 11, indicates a condition that an applicant or operator is required to comply with in order carry out an Article 11 risk assessment using the UK SORA methodology.

‘Should’ indicates a strong recommendation: while the applicant or operator is not required to comply with the recommendation to rely on UK SORA, the CAA would expect it to have regard to the recommendation and provide clear and rational justification for not following it.

‘May’ indicates discretion.

‘Must not’ indicates prohibition

Applicant

1.49

The applicant is the individual or organisation applying for an operational authorisation. The applicant must substantiate the safety of the operation by completing the UK SORA. Compliance evidence for the assessment may be provided by third parties (e.g., the designer of the UAS or equipment, UTM service providers, etc.).

Operator

1.50

The operator is an applicant that has obtained an operational authorisation from the CAA. The authorisation allows the operator to perform a series of flights, if they are performed in accordance with the scope and limitations of the operational authorisation, based on the UK SORA compliance demonstration. The responsibilities of the operator are described in UK Reg (EU) 947/2019 UAS.SPEC.050 - Responsibilities of the UAS operator.

Designer

1.51

The legal person or design and production organisation responsible for the development and manufacture of a UAS.

Air navigation service provider (ANSP)

1.52

The ANSP is the designated provider of air traffic service in a specific area of operation (airspace). The ANSP assesses and/or should be consulted whether the proposed operation may be safely conducted in the particular airspace that they cover. Whether an ANSP approval would be required may depend on whether the particular operation may be considered as being compliant with the rules of the air or should be managed as a contained hazard.

UTM service provider

1.53

UTM service providers are entities that provide services to support safe and efficient use of airspace.

Airspace managers

1.54

The Special Use Airspace (SUA) Authority is responsible for ensuring that appropriate processes and procedures exist to ensure the safe and efficient management and operation of the SUA it is responsible for. Where SUA affects IFR flight planning it should be managed by an Airspace Management Cell (AMC) and referred to as an AMC Managed Area (AMA).

Remote pilot in command and flight crew

1.55

The responsibilities of a remote pilot and crew are defined in UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947, UAS.SPEC.060 Responsibilities of the remote pilot. The definition of Remote Pilot can be found in UK Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (The Basic Regulation) Article 3(31).

Maintenance staff

1.56

Ground personnel in charge of maintaining the UAS before and after flight in accordance with UAS maintenance instructions.

UK SORA application phases

1.57

The UK SORA application process is divided into two broad phases: the final SAIL assessment phase 1, and the compliance evidence assessment phase 2. The table below describes the individual steps per phase of the application process.

Table 2 - UK SORA Application Phases

Phase Number	Step Number	Step Description
1	1	Login to the UK SORA application service
1	2	Determine the intrinsic Ground Risk Class (iGRC)
1	3	Apply strategic ground risk mitigations (Optional)
1	4	Determine the initial air risk class (ARC)
1	5	Apply strategic air risk mitigations (Optional)
1	6	Initial SAIL determination
1	7	Complete the operation details and provide compliance approach and evidence for mitigations
1	8	Phase 1 payment and CAA assessment
1	9	Final SAIL decision
2	10	Provide OSO compliance evidence
2	11	Provide containment compliance evidence
2	12	Provide Tactical mitigation performance requirement (TMPR) compliance evidence
2	13	Phase 2 payment and CAA assessment
2	14	Operational authorisation decision

Step 1 Login to the UK SORA application service

1.58

In Step 1, applicants must login to the UK SORA application service using their operator ID.

Step 2 Determination of the intrinsic Ground Risk Class (iGRC)

1.59

The applicant must determine the intrinsic ground risk class (iGRC). The applicant must consider the following when determining the information to be entered into the application:

(i) Determine the maximum characteristic dimension and the maximum possible speed of the UA in accordance with the manufacturer data.

(ii) Identify the iGRC footprint by completing the following 3 tasks:

(1) Identify the flight volume.

(2) Calculate the contingency volume.

(3) Calculate the initial ground risk buffer.

(iii) Identify the maximum population density within the iGRC footprint.

(iv) Identify the iGRC of the footprint using Table 3 for the UA.

1.60

The final ground risk buffer calculation will be completed as part of the Containment step.

Determining the UA characteristics

1.61

To establish the characteristics of the UA, the applicant must consider the following:

(i) Dimension: Define the maximum size of the UA by its wingspan for fixed-wing aircraft, or maximum distance between blade tips for rotorcraft.

(ii) Maximum Speed: This is defined as the maximum possible airspeed the UA may achieve, as specified by its Designer. It is important to note that this refers to the potential maximum speed, not the maximum speed of the proposed operation. Mitigations that reduce speed during an impact are detailed separately in Annex B.

Determination of the iGRC

1.62

Table 3 shows how the iGRC is determined.

Table 3 - iGRC Determination

Maximum population density	Maximum UA characteristic dimension or maximum speed
	1 meter or 25m/s	3 meters or 35m/s	8 meters or 75m/s	20 meters or 120m/s	40 meters or 200m/s
Controlled Ground Area	iGRC 1	iGRC 1	iGRC 2	iGRC 3	iGRC 3
5 people/km2	iGRC 2	iGRC 3	iGRC 4	iGRC 5	iGRC 6
50 people/km2	iGRC 3	iGRC 4	iGRC 5	iGRC 6	iGRC 7
500 people/km2	iGRC 4	iGRC 5	iGRC 6	iGRC 7	iGRC 8
5,000 people/km2	iGRC 5	iGRC 6	iGRC 7	iGRC 8	iGRC 9
50,000 people/km2	iGRC 6	iGRC 7	iGRC 8	iGRC 9	iGRC 10
>50,000 people/km2	iGRC 7	iGRC 8	n/a	n/a	n/a

 

1.63

A UA weighing less than or equal to 250g and having a maximum speed less than or equal to 25 m/s is considered to have an iGRC of 1 regardless of population density.

1.64

A UA expected to not penetrate a standard dwelling will get a -1 GRC reduction in Step 3 from the M1(A) sheltering mitigation when not overflying large open-air assemblies of people. See Annex B for additional details.

1.65

Operations that do not have a corresponding iGRC (i.e., grey coloured cells in table 3) are outside the scope of the UK SORA methodology. If UK SORA may not be used, the applicant should contact the CAA regarding the options available.

iGRC footprint

1.66

The applicant must define the ground area at risk for the specific operation, termed the iGRC footprint. The calculation should account for the UA's ability to maintain its position in four dimensions (latitude, longitude, height, and time). Factors such as navigation precision, flight technical errors, mapping inaccuracies, and system latencies must be considered.

Figure 4 - iGRC Footprint

1.67

The maximum population density within the iGRC must be used by the applicant.

Qualitative Ground Risk Determination

1.68

If population density values are not available, not accurate, or an applicant would rather use qualitative descriptors for the iGRC table, the following approximations may be used as guidance:

Qualitative ground risk

Controlled areas and/or extremely remote places

1.69

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) = 0

1.70

Descriptor: Areas where unauthorised people are not allowed to enter and/or hard to reach areas, where it is reasonably expected that no one will be present:

• Areas of land without public access

• Large bodies of water away from commercial, industrial or recreational users

Areas where a few people may be present

1.71

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) = 5

1.72

Descriptor: Unpopulated areas with public right of way access by road, cycle path, footpath, bridleway, canal, etc., and/or habited rural areas smaller than a hamlet, and/or bodies of water away from commercial, industrial, or recreational users:

• Forests

• Moorland and heathland

• Large areas of farmland

• Solitary dwellings

• Remote recreational areas

Sparsely populated areas

1.73

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) = 50

1.74

Descriptor: Sparsely populated residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas with large areas of land, and/or bodies of water close to residential, commercial, industrial or recreational areas:

• Hamlets

• Clusters of small farms

• Residential areas with very large plots of land

• Small industrial and commercial areas

• Small recreational areas

• Small marinas and boat moorings

Lightly populated areas

1.75

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) = 500

1.76

Descriptor: Lightly populated residential, commercial and industrial areas with large areas of land, and/or bodies of water within lightly used commercial, industrial and/or recreational areas:

• Villages

• Medium sized industrial and commercial areas

• Medium sized recreational areas

• Small campsites

• Small tourist attractions

• Large marinas

Moderately populated areas

1.77

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) = 5000

1.78

Descriptor: Moderately populated residential, commercial and industrial areas with moderate areas of land, and/or bodies of water within moderately used commercial, industrial and/or recreational areas. May contain multistorey buildings, but generally most should be low rise:

• Towns

• Residential homes on small plots

• Small blocks of flats and/or apartment complexes

• Large industrial and commercial areas

• Large recreational areas

• Large campsites

• Large/popular tourist attractions

• Harbours and ports

Heavily populated areas

1.79

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) = 50,000

1.80

Descriptor: Heavily populated residential, commercial and industrial areas with small areas of land, or bodies of water within heavily used commercial, industrial or recreational areas. Urban areas mainly consist of large multistorey buildings. Organised assemblies of people:

• Cities

• Large blocks of flats and/or apartment complexes

• Large office blocks

• Small and medium sized festivals

• Small and medium sized shows and exhibitions

• Small and medium sized sporting events

• Ports with cruise ship docking areas.

Heavily populated areas

1.81

Maximum Population Value (people/km2) more than 50,000

1.82

Descriptor: Densest populated residential, commercial and industrial areas consisting mainly of tall multi storey buildings or popular events with large assemblies of people:

• City Centres

• Areas of dense high-rise buildings

• Large/popular festivals

• Large/popular shows and exhibitions

• Large/popular sporting events

Ground risk buffer

1.83

The applicant must define a ground risk buffer that includes an initial calculation and outcome. Refer to JARUS SORA 2.5 Annex A for further guidance. An appropriate initial ground risk buffer could be defined:

(i) With a 1-to-1 principle, (UA height AGL ≤ distance away from uninvolved people); or

(ii) A different ground risk buffer value may be proposed using the principles outlined in Annex E, Containment.

1.84

The initial ground risk buffer will normally be the same as the final ground risk buffer. However, if appropriately robust strategic mitigations are employed, there are cases where the final ground risk buffer may be different than the initial one. These could include:

(i) Using a medium or high level of containment.

(ii) Use of ground risk mitigations, such as a parachute.

Controlled ground areas

1.85

A controlled ground area is defined as an area that must only contain involved persons.

1.86

Controlled ground areas may be used to strategically mitigate the ground risk. The area that must be controlled is the iGRC footprint. Assurance that there will be no uninvolved persons in the iGRC footprint is the responsibility of the operator.

Non-typical cases

1.87

There are certain cases, for example aircraft whose maximum characteristic dimension and maximum speed differ significantly from the selected column, which may have a large effect on the iGRC. This may not be well represented in the iGRC table and lead to an increase or decrease in iGRC. See JARUS SORA Annex F Section 1.8 for further guidance.

1.88

The applicant may consider that the iGRC is too conservative for their UA. Therefore, an applicant may decide to calculate the iGRC by applying the mathematical model defined in JARUS SORA 2.5 Annex F Section 1.8. The operator should choose the column that matches their risk as identified in JARUS SORA 2.5 Annex F Table 33.

Population density information

1.89

Determining the population density to calculate the iGRC in Step 2 should be done using maps with appropriate grid size based on the operation. See Population density data sources for further guidance.

1.90

If there are no acceptable population density maps available, or if designated by the CAA, the qualitative population density descriptors (see Table 3) may be used to estimate the population density band in the operational volume and ground risk buffer. Alternatively, the authority may require or permit applicants to provide appropriate population density maps. Table 4 below presents the suggested optimal grid size for different maximum operating heights.

Table 4 - Suggested grid size for authoritative maps

Max. Height (AGL) in Feet	Max. Height (AGL) in Metres	Suggested Optimal Grid Size (metre x metre)
500	152	> 200 x 200
1,000	305	> 400 x 400
2,500	762	> 1,000 x 1,000
5,000	1,524	> 2,000 x 2,000
10,000	3,048	> 4,000 x 4,000
20,000	6,096	> 5,000 x 5,000
60,000	18,288	> 10,000 x 10,000

Population density data sources

1.92 The following population density data sources may be used when determining the iGRC:

(i) ONS Census Data https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/maps/

(ii) ESA Copernicus Data https://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Copernicus

(iii) Survey data collected by the applicant.

(iv) Other resources may be used, subject to the applicant verifying the accuracy of the data and evidencing their data verification process.

Step 3 Final Ground Risk Class (GRC) determination

1.91

This step is only required if the applicant is planning to reduce their iGRC with strategic mitigations.

1.92

Acceptable mitigations may reduce the intrinsic risk of an uninvolved person being struck by a UA during a LOC. An applicant that wishes to reduce their iGRC must identify and apply suitable ground risk mitigations. Annex B contains further guidance on how to complete this step.

Ground Risk Mitigations

1.93

The applicant should identify the applicable mitigations listed in Table 5 that could lower the iGRC of the iGRC footprint. All mitigations must be applied in numerical sequence.

Table 5 - Strategic Ground Risk Mitigations

Ref	Mitigation	Low Robustness	Medium Robustness	High Robustness
M1A	Strategic mitigation - Sheltering	-1	-2	N/A
M1B	Strategic mitigations - Operational restrictions	N/A	-1	-2
M1C	Tactical mitigations - Ground observation	-1	N/A	N/A
M2	Effects of UA impact dynamics are reduced	N/A	-1	-2

1.94

In case a mitigation that affects the UA aerodynamics is used, assess if the size of the ground risk buffer is still valid.

Application of Ground Risk Mitigations

1.95

The mitigations used to modify the iGRC have a direct effect on the safety objectives associated with an operation, and therefore it is important to ensure their robustness. This is particularly relevant for technical mitigations (e.g., parachute), where limitations to the robustness and effectiveness of mitigations must be considered.

1.96

The Final GRC determination is based on the availability and correct application of the mitigations. Table 5 provides a list of potential mitigations and the associated relative correction factor. All mitigations must be applied in numeric sequence to perform the assessment i.e. M1(A), M1(B), M1(C), M2. Annex B provides additional details on the robustness requirements for each mitigation.

1.97

When applying all the M1 mitigations, the final GRC may not be reduced to a value lower than the lowest value in the applicable column in Table 5. This is because it is not possible to reduce the number of people at risk below that of a controlled ground area.

1.98

In case the mitigation influences the aerodynamics of the UA, for example by using a parachute, the ground risk buffer size should be redefined using correct assumptions including the effects of the mitigation means.

1.99

If the final GRC is higher than 7, the operation is considered to have more risk than the UK SORA is designed to support. The applicant should contact the CAA regarding the options available, such as using the Certified category as defined in Article 6 of UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947.

Step 4 Determination of the initial Air Risk Class (ARC)

1.100

In this step, the applicant must assess the initial Air Risk Class (ARC) of the operational volume. The initial ARC is a qualitative classification that describes the general collision risk associated with UAS operations before any strategic mitigations are applied.

1.101

The UK SORA Air Risk Model currently only considers encounters between UA and crewed aircraft. A Mid Air Collision (MAC) event between an UA and a crewed aircraft is always assumed to be catastrophic. Additionally, the ability of a crewed aircraft to remain well clear or to avoid collisions with the UA is not directly considered at present.

1.102

The Air Risk model applies to all categories of UAS and all classes of airspace. While the UK SORA methodology is intended to be used to assess UAS operations within the ‘specific’ category, the risk assessment process also allows identification of operations that belong within the ‘certified’ category, and / or where certified components may be required within the ‘specific’ category.

General - Aviation conflict management and BVLOS scalability

1.103

Conflict management within the existing global aviation system is premised on cockpit-based pilot see-and-avoid supporting elements of both layer two and three of the following three-layer system:

(i) Layer 1: Strategic conflict management – Airspace design, demand & capacity balancing, traffic synchronisation. ‘Strategic’ is used here to mean ‘in advance of tactical’. The objective of this layer is to minimise the need to apply the second layer.

(ii) Layer 2: Separation provision – This is a tactical (in-flight) process where the pilot must ensure that the aircraft is not operated in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard. Typically, this is achieved via cockpit-based see-and-avoid but may be supplemented through the application of separation minima or provision of collision hazard information by an ATM service, dependent upon the airspace classification and flight rules followed.

(iii) Layer 3: Collision avoidance – Required when the separation mode has been compromised, this layer is predominately based on cockpit view pilot ‘see & avoid’, although for some categories of aircraft, and in some categories of airspace, this may be augmented by systems such as Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).

1.104

For UAS operations BVLOS of the remote pilot and outside of segregated airspace, a Detect and Avoid (DAA) capability is therefore required to replace the pilot see-and-avoid responsibilities. DAA is defined within the ICAO RPAS Manual Doc 10019 as providing “the capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action”. The DAA system therefore enables the Remote Pilot (RP) to exercise their responsibilities with regard to other aircraft, as required within the standardised rules of the air.

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Within their RPAS Concept of Operations (CONOP) for International IFR, ICAO also define the following:

(i) Accommodation – Where UAS may operate along with some level of adaptation or support that compensates for its inability to comply within existing operational constructs.

(ii) Integration – Where UAS enter airspace system routinely without requiring special provisions.

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DAA, as defined above, is therefore a critical enabler for BVLOS UAS operations and the safe integration of UAS into the wider airspace environment. Where the DAA capability is not able to fully replicate the pilot cockpit see-and-avoid capability then accommodation is still possible, with the required ruleset and procedures dependent on the capability of the DAA system.

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The scalability of the BVLOS solution may then be defined by the restrictions imposed on other air users for the accommodation of UAS operations. Such restrictions may include:

(i) Loss of airspace access, e.g., segregation of UA from all other air users.

(ii) Mandatory equipment carriage, e.g., Electronic Conspicuity (EC).

(iii) Air traffic management procedures, e.g., a separation or deconfliction service to structure traffic within the airspace.

(iv) Air traffic density restrictions, e.g., to enable large separation distances.

(v) Air traffic speed / size restrictions, e.g., low speed light aircraft only.

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The requirement for such restrictions, and hence the scalability of the BVLOS solution, is determined largely by the assured performance capability of the UAS DAA system.

Quantitative air risk flow chart

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Figure 5 is the underlying air risk characterisation flow chart describing the UK SORA air risk model characterisation process.

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The UK SORA application service guides applicants through the characterisation process.

Figure 5 - Quantitative Air Risk Flowchart

Encounter Types

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Encounters with two distinct types of flight operations are considered:

(i) Type-1: Operations primarily conducted under self-separation and see-and-avoid (primarily in uncontrolled airspace).

(ii) Type-2: Operations that occur with separation provided by an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) (primarily in controlled airspace).

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Encounters between UA and both Type-1 and Type-2 flight operations are considered, where an encounter is defined as an event associated with the presence of an intruder aircraft. An encounter is simply a measure of when the proximity of two aircraft becomes such that the operation of the UA may be impacted, and the UA may be required to take action to reduce the risk of a MAC, or where a simulation or timeline may start.

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When considering an encounter, its definition must be large enough to include anything which may influence the tactical mitigations of the UA, but not so large that it considers the impact of factors which clearly have no material impact on the operation, such as flights several hundred miles away.

Air Risk Classifications (ARC)

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There are four levels of ARC:

(i) ARC-a (minimal risk);

(ii) ARC-b (Low risk);

(iii) ARC-c (Medium risk); and

(iv) ARC-d (High risk).

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The UK-specific flowchart focusses primarily on encounter types, the airspace ruleset and whether the air environment is either recognised or contains known traffic. The initial ARC assignment has a limited emphasis on encounter rates, which are difficult to predict in a generalised model and are considered primarily via strategic mitigations. Key elements within the flowchart and initial ARC assignment are below:

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Atypical – An Atypical Air Environment (AAE) is not a separate classification of airspace, and it may exist within any classification of airspace. Broadly, it may be considered to be a volume of airspace in which it may be reasonably anticipated that there is likely to be an ‘improbable encounter rate’ with crewed air traffic due to the proximity of certain ground infrastructure, rendering it hazardous for most traditional forms of aviation.

The following examples of what may be considered an AAE should be used as a guide:

(i) Within 100ft / 30.5m of any building or structure.

(ii) Within 50ft of a permanent, above ground level, linear structure. For example, a railway, road, or powerline.

(iii) Within the confines of private property at a height not exceeding 50ft. For example, an industrial site where security personnel use a UA for perimeter inspection.

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CAP 3040 contains further guidance on characterising Atypical Air Environments.

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Above FL660 – Within the UK this region may contain several different types of aircraft, including crewed military, experimental crewed, High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS, space launch, civil faster than sound, high-altitude balloons, etc. Therefore, this region may not be treated as segregated without further consideration and potentially mitigation. Note that special consideration will also be required for ingress to / egress from the operating volume, as well as contingency management due to potential risk to aircraft within airspace below the potential operating area.

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Class A – This class of airspace provides the highest level of control and is only available to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) traffic. Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance and continuous air-ground voice communication is required, and all traffic is under an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) provided separation service. Encountered traffic is expected to be predominately (but not exclusively) large commercial transport, and within the initial ARC flowchart exclusively meets the Type-2 encounter definition. The highest severity consequences lead to the highest safety standard; therefore, an initial ARC-d assignment is appropriate.

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Class C or D – These classes are grouped together as they both allow IFR and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic and follow a similar standard ruleset, where flights are subject to ATC clearance and all traffic is provided with an air traffic control service. In ‘Area of known IFPs’ (See definition below) the aircraft will be predominantly (but not exclusively) large commercial air transport, flying under IFR with a separation service and therefore encounter Type-2 will be appropriate, which dictates initial ARC-d. Outside of this known area, the general risk is from smaller GA aircraft flying under VFR with self-separation through see-and-avoid and therefore encounter Type-1 will be appropriate, which dictates initial ARC-c. The exception is in Class D below 500ft where the traffic is known, cooperative and flies below 500ft by exception (and with ATC knowledge), where the ability to predict a lower encounter rate in this environment allows a lower initial ARC-b characterisation. For example, a crewed aircraft is conspicuous, identified and provided with specific traffic information for a VFR transit within Class D airspace. A clearance to transit ‘not above 1500ft’ is given due to IFR traffic above and ATC request that the crewed aircraft report if descending below 500ft for any reason (landing, forced down by weather etc). Both the UAS and crewed aircraft are in receipt of specific traffic information and will be aware of the others relative position (where necessary) and as the crewed aircraft will report if descending below 500ft, it is a known and cooperative situation where the encounter rate may be controlled and predicted.

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Area of known IFPs – Means Instrument Flight Procedures (IFPs) including airways, Standard Instrument Departures (SIDs), Standard Arrival Routes (STARs), Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs), IFP Protected Areas (Aerodrome Safeguarding) and radar manoeuvring areas. The presence of structures such as Flight Restriction Zones (FRZ) and Control Zones, may indicate the presence of an IFP.This area may be expected to contain predominantly large commercial transport aircraft, hence is assumed to meet the Type-2 encounter definition and justify an ARC-d assignment.

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Area VFR corridor / Low Level (LL) Helicopter – Means corridors through controlled airspace with defined boundaries where aircraft may fly VFR, which have specific rules for altitudes, frequencies, and directions, but maintain the background classification and ruleset of the airspace in which they are contained.

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Class E or G – These classes are grouped together as they both allow IFR and VFR traffic and follow a similar standard ruleset (for participating non-IFR traffic), particularly where the VFR traffic is potentially unknown and uncooperative due to the lack of EC and VHF communication requirements. The decision of which encounter type to use for operations in Class E airspace should be made on a case-by-case basis, as the proximity and type of IFR traffic could dictate Type-1 or Type-2 encounters depending on local operations. Class E Airspace is established to ensure separation between IFR and IFR traffic, but not between IFR and VFR traffic despite the likelihood of an ‘area of known IFPs’. Therefore, to be proportionate to the requirements for crewed aircraft as participating non IFR traffic, the UAS requirement equivalent to see and avoid would dictate initial ARC-c. The VFR aircraft should be predominantly small General Aviation or light commercial, self-separated using see and avoid and therefore encounter Type-1 will be appropriate which also dictates initial ARC-c. There is no differentiation below 500ft in these classes of airspace as the traffic is potentially unknown, uncooperative and may fly below 500ft without warning. The ability to predict a lower encounter rate in this environment is therefore greatly reduced and does not allow a lower ARC characterisation ahead of strategic mitigation. All operations above and below 500ft in this environment are therefore initial ARC-c.

General

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In order to navigate the generalised flowchart applicants are referred to the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) [NATS, electronic Aeronautical Information Service, NATS UK, NATS UK | Home (ead-it.com) ] which defines UK airspace classifications, airspace structures and formal VFR routes such as London Helicopter and Manchester low level routes. Local area specifics on traffic types, informal patterns, mean traffic density and encounter rates (as confirmed via airspace characterisation) may be considered via strategic mitigations.

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It should also be noted that although the initial ARC is intended to be conservative, there may be situations where that conservative assessment may be insufficient. In those situations, the CAA may disagree with the applicant’s initial ARC.

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Irrespective of the Air Risk Class (ARC), an applicant must initially consider the expected ruleset of the airspace, Section 6 Airspace Classification, proposing changes only if necessary, and with agreement of the ANSP and authority where required. Further information on these rules, for VLOS operations, can be found in AMC1 and GM1 to UAS.SPEC.040(1)(b).

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Use the highest ARC score if the operating area spans multiple ARCs.

Step 5 Application of strategic mitigations to determine residual ARC (optional)

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This step is only required if the applicant is planning to reduce their initial ARC with strategic mitigations.

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Strategic mitigation involves procedures and operational restrictions designed to manage the types of crewed aircraft, encounter rates, or exposure times before take-off. If an applicant believes the initial Air Risk Class (ARC) is too high for the conditions in the local operational volume, they should consult Annex C for guidance on reducing the ARC. If the initial ARC is deemed appropriate for the local conditions, it is then considered the Residual ARC.

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Guidance for the application of strategic mitigations is provided in Annex C.

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To illustrate the value of different strategic mitigations a description of the residual ARCs is provided in Annex C Paragraphs C15-C19.

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For VLOS operations the initial air risk class may be reduced by one class. This may only be reduced to a minimum of ARC-b. This may include the use of an observer in order to meet the VLOS requirement. This could be an Airspace Observer (such as, for BVLOS VM operations), or a UA Observer (such as for First person View operations). The use of an Airspace, or UA, observer must be justified, in claiming this reduction, including demonstrating that instantaneous and effective communication between the Remote Pilot and observer is achieved, thereby enabling immediate and effective collision avoidance action to be taken by the Remote Pilot at all times.

The initial air risk class may be reduced to ARC-a if the operational volume meets the requirements of an Atypical airspace environment, or is later reduced by strategic mitigation(s). In certain environments an additional agreement with ATC or the airspace manager may be required. Further information on VLOS UAS operations above 400ft, within controlled airspace, may be found in AMC1 UAS.SPEC.040(1)(b).

Step 6 – Specific Assurance and Integrity Levels (SAIL) determination

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The SAIL consolidates the final ground and air risk scores. It determines the required compliance evidence the applicant must submit for assessment.

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Below is the underlying SAIL calculation table for applicant’s reference.

Table 6 - SAIL Determination

Final GRC	Residual ARC a	Residual ARC b	Residual ARC c	Residual ARC d
Final GRC ≤2	SAIL 1	SAIL 2	SAIL 4	SAIL 6
Final GRC 3	SAIL 2	SAIL 2	SAIL 4	SAIL 6
Final GRC 4	SAIL 3	SAIL 3	SAIL 4	SAIL 6
Final GRC 5	SAIL 4	SAIL 4	SAIL 4	SAIL 6
Final GRC 6	SAIL 5	SAIL 5	SAIL 5	SAIL 6
Final GRC 7	SAIL 6	SAIL 6	SAIL 6	SAIL 6
Final GRC >7	Certified category	Certified category	Certified category	Certified category

Step 7 – Operation Details

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The operation details are used to describe the proposed operation and demonstrate how the SAIL calculation has been determined.

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The applicant must complete the operation details pages, providing the following information:

(i) A brief overview of the operation.

(ii) The make and model of the UA they plan to operate under their authorisation (plus details of any modifications).

(iii) The industry or sector they will operate in, for example agriculture.

(iv) Where they want to operate.

(v) Details of their operational volume and ground risk buffer.

(vi) Details of how they worked out the population densities for the operational area and adjacent area (if applicable).

(vii) Details of any dangerous goods they intend to carry.

(viii) Details of any articles they plan to drop from their UA.

Step 8 - Phase 1 Assessment

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The purpose of this step is for the applicant to submit their SAIL calculation, operational details, and compliance evidence.

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Complete all required steps in the UK SORA application service.

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Make the required Phase 1 payment when prompted.

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The status of the assessment can be found in the relevant section of the UK SORA application service summary page.

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Assessment feedback is provided as it becomes available to allow applicants to action findings as soon as possible.

Step 9 - Final SAIL Decision

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The purpose of this step is for the applicant to receive a decision and feedback on their SAIL calculation.

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If the SAIL is approved the applicant may move to Phase 2.

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If the SAIL is not approved, the applicant will receive feedback in the form of findings. The applicant must address the findings to move to Phase 2.

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If the applicant disagrees with a finding or multiple findings, they have the right to appeal. More information about the appeals process can be found here.

Step 10 Determination of containment requirements

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The containment requirements are derived from the difference between the final ground risk level in the operational volume, plus ground risk buffer, and the final ground risk level in the adjacent area.

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The applicant must apply at least the level of containment required to ensure that the safety of the operation is maintained in the event of a LOC resulting in the aircraft leaving the operational volume.

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There are three possible levels of robustness for containment: Low, Medium, and High; each with a set of safety requirements described in Annex E.

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If the ground risk buffer is larger than the adjacent area, containment requirements do not apply.

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If the UA is less than 250g, the applicant must apply Low containment, or higher. In this case there is no requirement to account for the population in the adjacent area.

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If the UA is more than 250g, the applicant must determine the size and population characteristics of the adjacent area. The section below explains how to do this.

Figure 6 - Adjacent area calculation

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Calculate the size of the adjacent area for the operation. The lateral outer limit of the adjacent area is calculated from the operational volume as the distance flown in 3 minutes at the maximum capable speed of the UA:

(i) If the distance is less than 5 km, use 5 km.

(ii) If the distance is between 5 km and 35 km, use the distance calculated.

(iii) If the distance is more than 35 km, use 35 km.

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Determine the average population density between the outer limit of the ground risk buffer and the outer limit of the adjacent area.

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Determine the presence of assemblies of people within 1 km of the outer limit of the operational volume.

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Determine a set of operational limits (average population density allowed and assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume) appropriate for intended operation using the Tables 5-12.

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The applicant must:

(i) Determine the operational limits for the acceptable average population density in the adjacent area.

(ii) Determine the operational limits for the acceptable size of assemblies of people within 1km surrounding the operational volume.

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Use Tables 7-12 to determine the required containment robustness level for the chosen operational limits, the characteristic dimension of the UA, and the SAIL of the operation.

Table 7 - Containment requirements 1m UA (<25 m/s)

Average population density allowed	No Upper Limit	No Upper Limit	< 50,000 ppl/km2
Assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume	> 400k	Assemblies of 40k to 400k	Assemblies < 40k
SAIL1 & 2	High	Medium	Low
SAIL 3	Medium	Low	Low
SAIL 4	Low	Low	Low
SAIL 5-6	Low	Low	Low

 

Table 8 - Containment requirements 3m UA (< 35 m/s) applicant claims sheltering as a mitigation

Average population density allowed	No Upper Limit	No Upper Limit	< 50,000 ppl/km2	< 5,000 ppl/km2
Assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume	> 400k	Assemblies of 40k to 400k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k
SAIL1 & 2	Out of scope	High	Medium	Low
SAIL 3	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low
SAIL 4	Medium	Low	Low	Low
SAIL 5-6	Low	Low	Low	Low

 

Table 9 - Containment requirements 3m UA (< 35 m/s) applicant does not claim sheltering as a mitigation

Average population density allowed	No Upper Limit	No Upper Limit	< 5,000 ppl/km2	< 500 ppl/km2
Assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume	> 400k	Assemblies of 40k to 400k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k
SAIL1 & 2	Out of scope	High	Medium	Low
SAIL 3	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low
SAIL 4	Medium	Low	Low	Low
SAIL 5-6	Low	Low	Low	Low

 

Table 10 - Containment requirements 8m UA (< 75 m/s) applicant does not claim sheltering as a mitigation

Average population density allowed	No Upper Limit	< 50,000 ppl/km2	< 5,000 ppl/km2	< 500 ppl/km2	< 50 ppl/km2
Assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume	> 400k	Assemblies of 40k to 400k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k
SAIL1 & 2	Out of scope	Out of scope	High	Medium	Low
SAIL 3	Out of scope	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low
SAIL 4	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low	Low
SAIL 5	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low
SAIL 6	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low

 

Table 11 - Containment requirements 20m UA (< 125 m/s) applicant does not claim sheltering as a mitigation

Average population density allowed	No Upper Limit	< 50,000 ppl/km2	< 5,000 ppl/km2	< 500 ppl/km2	< 50 ppl/km2
Assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume	> 400k	Assemblies of 40k to 400k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k
SAIL1 & 2	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	High	Medium
SAIL 3	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	Medium	Low
SAIL 4	Out of scope	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low
SAIL 5	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low	Low
SAIL 6	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low

 

Table 12 - Containment requirements 40m UA (< 200 m/s) applicant does not claim sheltering as a mitigation

Average population density allowed	No Upper Limit	< 50,000 ppl/km2	< 5,000 ppl/km2	< 500 ppl/km2	< 50 ppl/km2
Assemblies allowed within 1km of the operational volume	> 400k	Assemblies of 40k to 400k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k	Assemblies < 40k
SAIL1 & 2	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	High
SAIL 3	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	Medium
SAIL 4	Out of scope	Out of scope	Out of scope	Medium	Low
SAIL 5	Out of scope	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low
SAIL 6	Out of scope	Medium	Low	Low	Low

 

Adjacent area

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The ground area adjacent to the ground risk buffer is defined as the adjacent area. This is the area where it is reasonably expected a UA may crash after a LOC.

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The operator must not plan flights in this area, and it will only be overflown unintentionally in the event of a LOC.

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The applicant may use a realistic estimate of the average population density for the adjacent area.

Adjacent area containment requirements

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The UK SORA application service will guide the applicant to determine the containment requirements.

Adjacent area operational limitations

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The operator must have a procedure to identify and consider whether there is an assembly of people that exceeds the operational limitations within 1 km of the operational volume.

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The operator must have a procedure to determine a realistic estimate of the size of any assembly of people within 1 km of the operational volume.

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If the ground risk buffer size exceeds 1km, the adjacent area consideration for all assemblies of people is not applicable.

Containment effects upon ground risk buffer and operational volume definitions

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The applicant may need to try different SAIL calculations, with variations of their operational volume, ground risk buffer and adjacent area before settling on an appropriate combination.

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If the applicant determines they require medium or high robustness containment for their operational objective, there might be a recursive effect, as these containment requirements have higher requirements on the fidelity of the ground risk buffer size calculation. It is possible, that this results in a bigger ground risk buffer size compared to the one originally defined by the operator.

Containment requirements for adjacent airspace

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By containing flight to the Operational Volume and assuring the immediate cessation of the flight in case of a breach of the operational volume, low robustness containment is generally considered sufficient to allow operations adjacent to all airspaces.

Step 11 Operational Safety Objectives (OSO)

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The purpose of this step is for the applicant to provide their compliance evidence for the relevant OSOs.

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The applicant is responsible for providing compliance evidence. Compliance evidence may be provided by third parties (e.g., the designer of the UAS or equipment, UTM service providers, etc.).

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Table 11 indicates the corresponding OSOs per SAIL. In this table:

(i) NR means not required;

(ii) L means low robustness;

(iii) M means medium robustness;

(iv) H means high robustness.

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The applicant should consider using low robustness even if the OSO is not required at the applicable SAIL.

Table 13 - Operational Safety Objectives (OSO)

OSO ID	OSO Description	SAIL 1	SAIL 2	SAIL 3	SAIL 4	SAIL 5	SAIL 6
OSO01	Ensure the operator is competent and/or proven	NR	L	M	H	H	H
OSO02	UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity	NR	NR	L	M	H	H
OSO03	UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO04	UAS components essential to safe operations are designed to an Airworthiness Design Standard (ADS)	NR	NR	NR	L	M	H
OSO05	UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability	NR	NR	L	M	H	H
OSO06	C3 link performance is appropriate for the operation	NR	L	L	M	H	H
OSO07	Conformity check of the UAS configuration	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO08	Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to address normal, abnormal and emergency situations potentially resulting from technical issues with the UAS or external systems supporting UAS operation, human errors or critical environmental conditions	L	M	H	H	H	H
OSO09	Remote crew trained and current and able to control the normal, abnormal and emergency situations potentially resulting from technical issues with the UAS or external systems supporting UAS operation, human errors or critical environmental conditions situation	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO13	External services supporting UAS operations are adequate to the operation	L	L	M	H	H	H
OSO16	Multi crew coordination	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO17	Remote crew is fit to operate	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO18	Automatic protection of the flight envelope from Human Error	NR	NR	L	M	H	H
OSO19	Safe recovery from Human Error	NR	NR	L	M	M	H
OSO20	A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission	NR	L	L	M	M	H
OSO23	Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO24	UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions	NR	NR	M	H	H	H

Step 12 Tactical mitigation performance requirement (TMPR) and robustness levels

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Tactical Mitigations are applied to mitigate any residual risk of a mid-air collision (as defined by the assigned residual ARC) needed to achieve the applicable airspace safety objective. Tactical Mitigations are usually applied after take-off using a “mitigating feedback loop” to reduce the rate of collisions by modifying the geometry and dynamics of aircraft in conflict, based on real time aircraft conflict information.

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Detailed guidance for the application of strategic mitigations is provided in Annex D.

VLOS Operations

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The applicant must develop and document a VLOS deconfliction scheme, in which it is explained which methods will be used for detection.

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The applicant must define the associated criteria applied for the decision to avoid other traffic. In case the remote pilot relies on detection by observers, the communication between the remote pilot and observer, including any specific phraseology, must be described as well.

BVLOS Operations

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Identify the applicable Detect and Avoid (DAA) requirements for the residual ARC.

Step 13 - Phase 2 Assessment

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The purpose of this step is for the applicant to submit their compliance evidence for OSOs, TMPR, and Containment. The CAA will then evaluate the proposed risk assessment and robustness of the mitigating measures, that the applicant proposes to keep the operation safe.

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The applicant should then:

• Complete all required steps in the UK SORA application service.

• Make the required Phase 2 payment when prompted.

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The CAA will assess the compliance evidence and other information provided by the applicant to determine whether the proposed mitigation measures are adequate and sufficiently robust to keep the operation safe in view of the identified ground and air risks, in order to decide whether to grant the operational authorisation.

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The applicant may obtain information about the progress of an ongoing assessment by checking the relevant section of the UK SORA application service summary page. Status updates are provided for each element of the risk assessment.

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Assessment feedback is provided as it becomes available to allow applicants to action findings as soon as possible.

Step 14 - Compliance Evidence Decision

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The purpose of this step is for the applicant to receive a decision and feedback about their application.

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If the application is approved, the CAA will grant an operational authorisation to the applicant.

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If the application is not approved, the CAA will not grant an Operational Authorisation and will provide feedback in the form of findings. The applicant must address the findings before an operational authorisation may be granted.

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If the applicant disagrees with one or more findings, they have the right to appeal. More information about the appeals process can be found here.